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     Abstract 
 
 In real world applications, cryptographic algorithms are implemented in hardware or software on 
specific devices. An active attacker may inject faults during the computation process and careful 
analysis of faulty results can potentially leak secret information. These kinds of attacks known as 
fault injection attacks may have devastating effects in the field of hardware and embedded 
cryptography.  This research proposes a partial implementation of SHA-256 along with an 
onboard fault injection circuit implemented on an FPGA. The proposed fault injection circuit is 
used to generate glitches in the clock to induce a setup time violation in the circuit and thereby 
produce error(s) in the output. The main objective of this research is to study the viability of fault 
injection using the clock glitches on the SHA-256. 
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Chapter 1  
Introduction   
 
The emerging demand for secure transmission of confidential information has resulted in the 
increased used of cryptographic algorithms in a wide range of applications such as smart cards, 
communication systems, electronic commerce etc. Cryptographic algorithms and protocols can 
be grouped into Symmetric and Asymmetric Encryption, Data Integrity Algorithms and 
Authentication Protocols. They are often used to provide confidentiality, authentication and non-
repudiation in different applications.  
Confidentiality: maintains restrictions on access to information thereby protecting it from 
unauthorized people or software. 
Authentication: may be one of two types namely data origin authentication or user 
authentication. Data origin authentication verifies that the source of data is original as claimed 
and user authentication verifies that the person is who she/he claims to be.  
Integrity: refers to protecting information from modification and destruction by unauthorized 
people.  
The cryptographic algorithms are designed in such a way that it is difficult to break them 
mathematically [1]. One can view the idea of cryptography from two different standpoints 
namely classical and physical.  
In the case of classical view the cryptographic primitive can be treated as a mathematical object 
that transforms an input into an output using some key. This idea is represented in Figure 1.1. In 
order to obtain the secret information the attacker needs to perform a brute force analysis or 
search the entire key space which in most of the cases is a computationally infeasible task. The 
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attackers might have access to the input and output to the system as well as knowledge of the 
algorithm. They try to get the secret key by solving the problem mathematically rather than using 
or tampering with the system.  The chosen plain text attack, chosen cipher text attack etc. are 
examples of such kind of attacks.  
 
 
   Input Output 
      
    
    Figure 1.1 Classical view of cryptography  
But this is not the case with physical attacks where attackers may take advantage of the 
implementation characteristics to retrieve secret information. These physical attacks are much 
more powerful as compared to the previously mentioned classical cryptanalysis techniques and 
are a serious threat to cryptosystems. The following section discusses a kind of physical attack 
known as Side Channel Attack, its basic principle and various types. 
 
1.1 Side Channel Attacks 
 
  Cryptographic algorithms are implemented in hardware or software on specific devices for real 
world applications. The behavior of these devices can be closely monitored and studied in such a 
way where information regarding the task being performed is leaked. This is the basic principle 
behind side channel analysis. The electronic devices performing encryption/decryption operation 
are inherently leaky and will produce side channel such as power consumption, timing 
information, electromagnetic leaks etc. This side channel view of a cryptographic device is 
presented in Figure 1.2. Side channel attacks based on timing information, power consumption, 
and electromagnetic measurements have been a major security concern in the industry for more 
than 15 years [2]. 
ENCRYPTION  
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    Figure 1.2 Side channel view of cryptography  
 These attacks usually have two phases: interaction phase and exploitation phase [3]. In the 
interaction phase the attacker tries to gather side channel information and in the exploitation 
phase the attacker performs careful analysis to reveal the secret information. Even though the 
implementation of these kind of attacks are highly platform dependent, they are a serious threat 
to the security systems.  The following section gives a brief overview on the classification of side 
channel analysis based on various criteria.  
 
1.1.1 Types of Side Channel Attacks  
  
The side channel attacks (SCA) can be broadly classified into three categories. A specific attack 
need not necessarily belong to only one specific category [3] and the categories are orthogonal.  
Based on access to the device: Invasive, Non-invasive and Semi-invasive 
The invasive attacks require the attacker to have full access to the device in order to extract 
information from the chip and study its functionality. These attacks are expensive and require 
sophisticated environment to carryout the operation. On the other hand the non-invasive attacks 
are often low cost attacks and do not require any physical contact with the device. The non-
invasive attacks make use of the available side channel information (such as emissions). In the 
ENCRYPTION  
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case of semi-invasive attacks the depackaging of a device is required to access its surface but the 
internal structure remains intact.  
Based on process control: Active and Passive  
In the case of passive attacks the system process/resources remain unaffected and the attacker 
gains information by observing the behavior of the device. This can be performed through 
eavesdropping or traffic analysis (in the case of computer networks) or side channel 
measurements such as power consumption, EM emissions, timing information etc. The passive 
attacks are often hard to detect since they involve no altering of the computational process or 
data whatsoever. Active attacks involve an attacker tampering with the device’s operation 
causing it to produce erroneous results that can be further exploited.  
Based on methods used in analysis: Simple and Differential  
The obtained side channel information can be analyzed using different methods. The simple side 
channel analysis (SSCA) typically involves a single trace and the secret information is directly 
read from it. An example for this can be a power trace that shows a peak value corresponding to 
1 and low value corresponding to 0 where the side channel is related to the instruction being 
executed. In the case of differential side channel analysis (DSCA), statistical methods are used 
to analyze the correlation between the data and the side channel information of a particular 
device.  
The first SCA using timing information was introduced by Kocher [4] who demonstrated the 
attack on the RSA modular exponentiation. The differential power analysis (DPA) attacks were 
demonstrated in 1999 on a hardware implementation of DES [5].  
 
 1.1.2 Fault Attacks  
  
Fault attacks are a different type of side channel attack where the attacker induces faults into the 
device during the cryptographic computation. The attacker may be able to extract secret 
information from analysis of the behavior of the cryptographic computations in the presence of 
the injected fault. These types of attacks are active where the attacker alters the computation 
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process and tries to recover secret information such as the key. For example, in 2000 Boneh et al. 
reported the first successful fault attack [6] on the RSA signature scheme. A detailed overview of 
fault attacks including various methods is given in the next chapter. 
 
1.2 Authentication and HMAC/SHA-256  
 
In applications such as banking, the integrity of encrypted data is a major concern. The 
authenticated encryption schemes based on hash functions can provide confidentiality and 
authentication of confidentiality. A cryptographic hash function accepts an arbitrary length input 
and produces an output of fixed length. It has the following properties: 
One way property (pre-image resistance): given the hash (h), it is computationally infeasible to 
find a message x such that hash(x) =h.   
Weak collision resistance (second pre-image resistance): given a block x, it is computationally 
infeasible to find y such that hash(x) =hash(y). 
Strong collision resistance: it is computationally infeasible to find (x, y), x not equal to y such 
that hash(x) =hash(y).  
Authentication functions can provide user authentication (passwords), message authentication 
using message authentication codes (MAC) and are also used in digital signatures to provide 
non-repudiation.  The data origin authentication points to the integrity of the message source and 
it ensures that a particular message is coming from a particular source and that it has not been 
altered in between.   
 
 1.2.1 Hash Based Message Authentication Codes  
 
Hash based message authentication codes (HMAC) are mainly used for data integrity and 
authentication applications. In order to meet the data integrity and data origin authentication in 
secure communication, the US National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has 
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recommended the use of Keyed Hash based Message Authentication Code (HMAC) [7] based on 
the Secure Hash Standard [8]. The SHS are a set of cryptographically secure hash algorithms 
(SHA) specified by NIST.  
HMAC along with SHS is used in several standards and protocols such as SSL, IPsec, and 
Internet Key Exchange (IKE) for the purpose of authentication and integrity verification.  
HMAC uses a cryptographic hash function to calculate the message authentication code (MAC) 
along with a key. In the beginning MD5 and SHA-1 were used in HMAC for instantiating the 
hash. The security of HMAC is directly dependent on the cryptographic strength of the 
underlying hash function. Since researchers have found effective collisions on both MD5 [9] and 
SHA-1 [10]  all the applications which use HMAC are forced to move towards the use of a more 
secure SHS. Google has announced that starting from November 2014 the Chrome browsers will 
be showing security warnings for those websites with SSL certificates using SHA-1 [11].  
In applications such as SSL and IPsec, implementing the HMAC/SHA as software consume a 
high proportion of the web server’s processing power. Hence the use of embedded systems such 
as hardware accelerators for performing cryptographic computations is gaining popularity [12]. 
Due to its high speed and security, Application Specific Integrated Circuits (ASIC) were initially 
preferred for such applications. But it is costly to update a particular crypto algorithm on an 
ASIC chip due to high design costs.  
On the other hand,  Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGA) have faster design cycles, 
generally supporting hardware reprogramming ability  and are becoming popular in the design of 
embedded systems. As compared to ASICs the FPGAs have several advantages in the context of 
implementing cryptographic algorithms [13] . Some of them are listed below: 
Flexibility: Most of the cryptographic protocols such as IPsec, SSL are algorithm independent 
which means they can accommodate more than one encryption or authentication algorithm. IPsec 
for example allows the use of AES, Triple DES, and HMAC-SHA. These algorithms typically 
will be updated in the future. Due to its flexibility FPGAs can be reconfigured easily with new 
algorithms.  
Resource Efficiency: In the case of hybrid protocols such as SSL, a private key and public key 
algorithm is used. The session key exchange uses the public key algorithm and the data 
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encryption is done using a private key algorithm. The same FPGA may be used for implementing 
both algorithms by means of run time reconfiguration [14].  
Architecture Efficiency:  To make an architecture more efficient, it can be made with specific 
parameters. In the case of a cryptographic algorithm these parameters can include the key, 
underlying finite field, etc. With the use of FPGA architectures can be designed and optimized 
for a certain set of parameters.  
Cost Efficiency: FPGA offers a low cost platform to implement algorithms in universities for 
studying architectures, side channel analysis etc.  
The above mentioned features offered by the FPGAs make them an attractive platform for 
implementing cryptographic applications. But one might wonder how secure these FPGAs are.  
Unlike Application Specific Integrated Circuits (ASIC) the commercial FPGAs may not have 
any specific feature to prevent side channel attacks. This thesis proposes a low cost environment 
to study the viability of fault injection using clock glitches on an FPGA partial implementation 
of SHA-256. The SHA-256 algorithm was selected mainly due to its importance in applications 
such as SSL, IPsec, and Secure Boot.  
 
1.3 Thesis Overview  
 
This thesis focuses on the viability of fault injection attack using clock glitches on an FPGA 
partial implementation of SHA-256 architecture. The thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 2 
introduces fault attacks, different methods of fault injection, HMAC and SHA-256 algorithms. A 
literature review on previous research in fault attacks is also included in this chapter. Chapter 3 
illustrates the methodology and experimental set up for generating the clock glitch. It is followed 
by introducing the FPGA board used. The two architectures considered for implementing the 
SHA-256 on FPGA are presented in Chapter 4 along with their simulation and synthesis results. 
The experimental results showing the viability of the set up time violation attack using clock 
glitches are also presented. Finally Chapter 5 provides a summary and conclusion of this work 
along with recommendations for future work.  
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Chapter 2  
Background and Related Work   
 
This chapter is dived into four sections. The first section provides a review of fault attacks – 
methods of fault injection and different types of faults. Section two provides a survey on 
previous research in fault attacks. The third section describes the HMAC-SHA-256 algorithm 
followed by a discussion of previous implementation techniques. The chapter concludes with 
section four that discusses the previous research on HMAC-SHA Fault Injection.  
 
2.1 Introduction to Fault Attacks 
 
 Fault attacks are a type of invasive side channel attack where malicious faults are injected into 
the cryptographic device. The output will be erroneous and careful analysis of such outputs 
called Differential Fault Analysis have proven to be highly effective [15] [16] [17]. A wide 
range of fault attacks has been reported and they differ on the basis of method of fault injection 
and types of faults.  
 2.1.1 Fault Injection Methods 
 
 The most common fault injection methods are as follows 
 Fault injection using glitches  
 Variation in clock – The attacker can tamper with the clock signal and vary its 
length by generating glitch cycles. If the length of a clock signal is shortened it 
can result in errors varying from corrupting a single byte to multiple bytes [18]. 
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The two most important effects of clock glitch based fault attacks are skipping an 
instruction and corrupting the data.  
 Variation in power supply – The attacker can generate glitches in the power 
supply line by injecting power spikes. Voltage underfeeding by using a separate 
unit that can tap into the device’s power supply line may also inject faults. These 
methods have been proven effective in the case of ASIC implementations of AES 
[19].   
  Fault injection using heating  
All electronic devices have a specific range of operating temperature. The devices will 
not work properly outside this range and extreme temperature can result in modification 
of RAM cells. The temperature side channel can be used for data leakages in the case of 
CMOS devices and has been demonstrated in a practical attack on RSA implementation 
[20]  
 Electromagnetic fault injection  
Electromagnetic pulses may be used to inject transient faults into a device [21]. This 
attack can even be carried out on packaged circuits and does not require de-capsulation of 
the device since the electromagnetic pulse can travel through non metallic surfaces.  For 
example, a fault injection attack using electromagnetic pulse on a software 
implementation of AES running on an 8 bit RISC microcontroller has been demonstrated 
[22] .  
 Optical fault injection 
The non volatile memory of microprocessors are sensitive to UV irradiation and these 
memory cells can be manipulated by high intensity laser beams. For example an 
experiment showing how a non-volatile memory can be erased using UV radiation has 
been performed [23] based on the AES implemented on an 8 bit microcontroller. The 
results shows that the attacker can precisely control the number of bits that are modified. 
The 256 bit S-box table of AES is manipulated and a single byte change in the table 
together with 2,500 pair of correct and fault cipher text, the key can be recovered with 
90% probability. Only a low cost UV-lamp and a standard decapsulation were required 
for this experiment.   
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 2.1.2 The Fault Types and Fault Models  
 
 The faults resulting from a fault injection attack can be broadly classified as transient faults and 
permanent faults.  
 Transient faults – Transient faults are provisional faults with effects being 
reversible, i.e. the circuit can resume its original behavior by reset or by stopping 
the fault stimuli. The effect of transient fault can cause the system to skip an 
instruction, store a wrong value etc.  
 Permanent faults – The value of cells are changed in permanent faults. These 
type of faults that are generally hard to inject can damage the data or the code 
being executed. Memory ciphering and scrambling physical address using 
different techniques are used to inject permanent faults.  
The above mentioned fault types can result in the following fault models.  
 Bit and Byte – A fault can result in modifying a single bit, byte or multiple bytes. 
Byte being the basic level for storing data, it is easy to change the value of a byte 
as compared to changing the value of a bit. A bit error model requires highly 
sophisticated equipment and it can break almost all cryptosystems.  
 Specific and random – In the case of a specific fault model, the attacker assumes 
that the data will be changed to a specific value upon injecting a fault. In general 
it is considered much easier and practical to induce random errors.  
 Static and Computational – The error can be induced into the memory or while 
performing an operation. The former type known as static is hard to induce 
whereas computational errors are more practical [24] 
 Data and Control – When the fault attack results in modifying the data it is 
called a data fault. An example of a control fault is such that the attack will result 
in skipping an instruction.  
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2.2 Previous Research in Cryptographic Clock-based 
Fault Injection 
  
This section presents a survey on the previous research in clock based fault injection attacks on 
some cryptographic algorithms other than HMAC/SHA. The fault based attacks on HMAC/SHA 
are reported in section 2.3.3.  
A practical fault attack results on six different type odd symmetric block ciphers listed on 
ISO/IEC 18033-3 implemented on an LSI : AES, DES, Camellia, CAST-128, SEED and 
MISTY1 is described in [25]. They have considered seven AES modules with different 
implementation styles and five modules for each of the five other block ciphers.   
 An experimental setup to provide a clock signal with a glitch to the LSI is developed and it can 
be used to inject a fault into any desired round.  They used a prototype ASIC called the 
“ISO/IEC 18033-3 Standard Cryptographic LSI” and it was mounted on the Side Channel Attack 
Standard Evaluation Board called SASEBO-R. The LSI was controlled using a host PC via an 
FPGA on the SASEBO board. The LSI controller set up in the FPGA supplies the required clock 
signal with glitch. Two external clocks with same frequency but different phases were selected 
and was switched at proper timing to generate glitches. The experimental setup is shown in 
Figure 2.1. Their experimental results claim that the for the same glitch width, the position of the 
error byte remains the same for different rounds. 
            
                                                            Figure 2.1 Experiment setup [25] 
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The interrelation between number of error bytes, glitch round and glitch width; position of error 
bits, glitch round and glitch width were investigated in their work.  They succeed in secret key 
retrieval using Piret’s attack [26] from all the AES modules with one pair of correct and faulty 
cipher text. To conduct this attack they started by performing a normal encryption using a 
plaintext selected at random. After this a clock glitch was generated in the final round of AES 
and maximized the glitch width by means of controlling the phase difference between two clock 
sources. That resulted in corrupting a single byte in the cipher text and it was recorded. Then 
they changed the position of the glitch to a different round and maintained the same glitch width. 
The corresponding faulty cipher text was recorded. They reduced the candidate key space using 
Piret’s attack and executed a brute force analysis on the reduced key space. Their results show an 
average reduced key candidate space of 232 and computational time of 8~35 minutes. The timing 
simulation results or the implementation information of the experiment presented in this work 
are not open.  
 
 In her Master’s thesis [27] Masoumeh Dadjou has presented an FPGA based uniform testbed for 
clock glitch fault injection targeting the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). The glitch 
generator module and the AES code provided in the DPA contest is implemented on an FPGA 
located on the SASEBO-G-II. It uses the same design idea of the glitch-clock generator used in 
[28].  The fault injection method described in this work was targeting the critical paths in the 
AES S-box rather than the key schedule. This work presents a detailed analysis on the glitch 
characteristics that causes the fault and also the effect of the fault. 
 The range of glitch period in which the fault injection happens is studied and the 
characterization of glitch is done based on its width and period. The author claims that the glitch 
width is an important factor in injecting the fault based on the experimental results. Their results 
show that decreasing the glitch period from a certain maximum to a minimum value within a 
window can increase the fault probability. The number and position of faulty bytes and bits with 
respect to the width of the glitch was experimented. With decreasing glitch period the number of 
fault bytes is said to have increased. The glitch was designed and characterized to be used in 
AES, and it was implemented on Xilinx FPGA with hardware modules that are not portable for 
use on other boards such as Altera DE2.  
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A glitch-clock generator based on FPGA for evaluating fault injection attack is presented in [28].  
It makes use of the clock management feature available on Xilinx FPGA boards and can be 
integrated on a single FPGA without the need of any external circuitry. The characteristic of this 
glitch generator is carefully studied using Side-Channel Attack Standard Evaluation board 
(SASEBO-G). Figure 2.2 shows the block diagram view of the fault injection system used in the 
work which was implemented on the SASEBO board. The glitch generation concept explained in 
this paper is given on Figure 2.3.  
 
                           
                               Figure 2.2 Fault injection system on SASEBO-G [28] 
 
 
                     
         Figure 2.3 Glitch generator concept [28] 
 
The authors claim that the timing of the glitches can be controlled at steps of 0.17 ns and they 
have also presented a safe-error attack against RSA using the proposed system. For this they 
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used an RSA processor, the proposed generator with a glitch period of 9.7 ns. In the case of safe 
error attack, the attacker uses power traces rather than output to distinguish between dummy 
operations and normal operations. Instead of this they have captured pair of power traces those 
ones with fault injection in multiplication operation and the ones without. The equality of 
operations were evaluated carefully by calculating the difference between the waveforms. In the 
case of dummy operations the amplitude of the differential power traces will be smaller. Thus the 
attacker can predict if the target operations are real or not. The authors claim to have obtained the 
secret exponent bits in RSA using their proposed method.  
The clock glitch attack in the presence of heating described in [29] and they use the same method 
of glitch generation proposed in [30] and [28]. They have done practical experiments on an 8-bit 
AVR microcontroller and the results show an increased success rate of glitch attack with increase 
in temperature.  
 
2. 3 SHA-256 and HMAC Algorithm  
 
This section gives an overview of the SHA-256 and HMAC algorithms with descriptions on the 
individual steps and operations involved. There is a lot of published works on the hardware 
implementation of SHA- 256 and HMAC [31] , [32] [33] [34] A brief description of a couple of 
those works are also included in this section.  
 
2.3.1 The Secure Hash Algorithm – 2 (SHA-2) 
 
Secure hash algorithm (SHA) was proposed as FIPS 180 SHS standard in 1993. In 1994 an 
existing flaw was corrected and the standard was referred to as SHA-1. The SHA-2 published in 
2008 refers to the FIPS PUB 180-3 [8]. SHA-2 is a family of hash functions, namely, SHA-224, 
SHA-256, SHA-384 and SHA-512. The input block size (B) for SHA-224/256 is 512 bits and for 
SHA-384/512 it is 1024 bits. The algorithm output is called message digest whose length (L) 
varies according to the algorithm used. SHA-224 produces a message digest of 224 bits, SHA-
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256 produces 256 bit length message digest and in general SHA-x produces an x- bit message 
digest.  The SHA-256 algorithm has two steps, namely pre-processing and hash computation. 
In pre-processing the original message is split into N blocks of B bits each. If the length of 
original message is not a multiple of block size, message padding is performed. The initial hash 
values are set according to the specification [8]. The hash computation is over 32 bit words 
(SHA-256) and the algorithm performs 64 iterations (j). The algorithm use six logical functions 
and are given below:  
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The RORn(x) is the circular rotation of the variable x by n positions to the right and SHRn(x) is 
the shifting of variable x by n positions to the right.  
PREPROCESSING  
Message Padding  
The SHA-256 accepts messages of length up to 264 bits as its input. The message is then padded 
such that its final length is a multiple of 512 bits. The padding process can be explained as 
follows: for a message M of length l, append “1” to the message followed by k zeros, where k is 
the smallest non-negative integer satisfying the equation l+k+1=448 mod 512. Finally add a 64 
bit block which is equivalent to the values of l in binary. The length of the padded message 
should now be a multiple of 512 bits.  
Message Parsing  
The next step is to parse the message into N different blocks of 512 bit each denoted as M (1) ,  
M(2), …, M(n). Each of these blocks are divided into 16 sub-blocks of 32 bit each denoted as M0(i), 
M1
(i),M2
(i),…, M15(i).  For each message block i, 1≤ i ≤ N, a four step digest round is performed as 
follows: 
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Step 1: Initialize the eight working variables 
,,,,
,,,,
)1(
7
)1(
6
)1(
5
)1(
4
)1(
3
)1(
2
)1(
1
)1(
0




iiii
iiii
HiHgHfHe
HdHcHbHa
 
Step 2: Prepare the message schedule 
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Step 3: For t = 0 to j-1 do: 
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HASH COMPUTATION 
 
Step 4: Compute the 
thi  intermediate hash value 
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After N blocks of messages are processed, the final message digest is obtained by concatenating 
the hash values as given below.  
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 2.3.2 The Hash Based Message Authentication Codes (HMAC)  
 
The message authentication codes (MAC) are widely used for data integrity and authentication 
[35]. HMAC involves the use of a cryptographic hash function along with the use of a secret key 
to compute a MAC. It was originally designed by Mihir Bellare, Ran Canetti, and Hugo 
Krawczyk in 1996 and later got published as a FIPS standard in 2002 [7]. HMAC can be 
described as follows: 
   HMAC(k,m) = [h((k xor opad), h(( k xor ipad),m))]t   
In the above equation h() stands for the cryptographic hash function, k is the secret key and ipad 
and opad are constants defined by the standard. The key must be B bytes long and the input text 
must be n-bits where 0≤ n ≤ 2B- 8B. The result of HMAC is obtained by taking the most 
significant t bytes out of the final hash such that L/2 ≤ t ≤ L, where L is the output length of   h () 
(e.g. 256-bits in the case of SHA-256).  
In the following section a brief review of the different proposed hardware implementations of 
SHA-256 and HMAC is included.  
 
 2.3.3 Previous Research in HMAC/SHA-2 Architectures  
 
The work presented in [33] introduces a specialized computational platform catering to the 
requirements of SHA-256 and HMAC.  The authors have considered five hardware/software 
partitioning levels for the mentioned algorithms and depending on these levels the operations 
were implemented in hardware. The logical operations involved in SHA -256 mentioned in 
Section 2.3.1 were all implemented as Nios II custom instructions after considering their 
execution times. Figure 2.4 shows the architecture proposed for implementing the HMAC/SHA-
256. The hash operation was designed to be performed on hardware and the rest of the 
computation was executed in software. Their approach allows the designer to implement the 
programs in C and move parts of the application execution easily to the hardware modules.   
They have analyzed all the partitioning levels with respect to the implementation area, program 
size and throughput. In the case of general purpose applications that do not involve the frequent 
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integrity check and MAC computation, the proposed approach is very useful. Their experimental 
results shows that the custom instruction approach can accelerate the speed of computation of 
message authentication codes and is very helpful in the case of constrained embedded systems 
that are used for integrity checks and authentication purposes.  
                          
                        Figure 2.4 HMAC/SHA-256 architecture [33] 
 
 
Dadda et al. in [36] presents a high speed ASIC unit for SHA-256 with reduced critical path 
delay. A basic scheme using carry save adders and a scheme using delay balancing to further 
shorten the critical path is also presented in their work (Figure 2.5). Their architecture was 
proposed mainly for ASIC implementations and the authors have examined several quasi-
pipelined methods also. The quasi-pipelined method was suggested to overcome the difficulties 
of the existing pipeline methods. The delay balancing was used to move certain function from 
the critical path of the design to shorter paths so that the critical path can be reduced. The results 
of their work claim to have a reduced critical path in the compressor block which makes it 
posssible to achieve a clock frequency of 819 MHz suitable for high speed implementations.  
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 Figure 2.5 SHA -256 design using CSA (left), Delay balancing and pipelining (right) [36] 
 
 
A high speed SHA-256 module, with higher throughput, ideal for IPsec software/hardware co-
design is presented in [37]. The critical paths in the SHA-256 algorithm was determined and to 
optimize the design, a set of operations were unrolled as shown in Figure 2.6 (a). Some of the 
intermediate values were pre-calculated during the course of certain operations and this was 
applied to the partially unrolled design. It was further optimized by means of data pre-fetching 
which is a system level pre computation technique. The values of  Wt & Kt  were computed 
outside the operation block and their sum was stored in registers thus making these values 
available at the beginning of each round. A block diagram of the proposed SHA-256 operation 
block is given in Figure 2.6(b) which is capable of carrying out multiple operations in a single 
clock cycle with an increase in throughput. 
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(a) Two unrolled SHA-256 operation blocks                       (b) Proposed design   
     
                      Figure 2.6 High Speed SHA-256 Hashing Module [37]         
  The proposed method is claimed to have high throughput (2190 Mbps) and small area 
requirement making it suitable for software/hardware co-design.  
The FPGA based SHA-256 architecture presented in [32]  was implemented on a Xilinx Virtex 
XCV300E-8 FPGA .They obtained a maximum throughput of 65 MB/s at 88 MHz clock. The 
work presented in [31] uses optimization techniques based on pipelining and unrolling to design 
a VLSI architecture for SHA-256 and SHA-512. It is mainly based on the quasi pipelined 
method suggested by Dada et al. in [36]. A VLSI implementation of SHA-256 with reduced 
critical path delay is given in [34] which uses a new structure for the adder by compromising 
delay and area.  
 
2.4 Previous Research in Fault Attacks on 
HMAC/SHA-256 
 
As compared to research work on fault attacks on other cryptosystems, there has not been much 
work done on the fault analysis of cryptographic hash functions. This could be due to the fact 
that hash functions are used primarily for computing message authentication codes and don’t 
involve the use of secret keys. But now that HMAC algorithms use SHS and the security of 
HMAC relies on the security of its underlying hash, it is of utmost importance that fault attacks 
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on hash functions needed to be studied and further researched. This section reviews some past 
research in Fault Analysis on Secure Hash Algorithms.  
The differential fault analysis (DFA) on the SHA -1 compression function is presented in [38]. 
The fault model described in this work is based on the assumption that the attacker can change 
the value of 32-bit words (SHA-1 operates on 32 bit word) in the last 20 rounds of the algorithm 
to some priori random values. There are two phases for the proposed DFA – the first phase is to 
computationally eliminate the final addition and the second phase is to apply the SHACAL-1 
attack described in [39]. The attack was simulated on a PC using Python scripting language to 
show the feasibility. By simulating the injection of faults in different locations of the 
compression function and processing around 1000 faulty outputs the authors claim that secret 
inputs can be extracted with high probability.  
A fault injection attack based on the method proposed in [39] is used against an FPGA 
implementation of SHA 512. The hardware architecture has an error injection module to emulate 
fault injection and the physical injection of fault is by using glitch on the power supply [40]. The 
fault model discussed is based on flipping the control bits to reduce the round number of SHA 
512 algorithm at specific times [41]. This is said to have an impact on reducing the round 
numbers thereby giving intermediate values as the final hash. 
The effect of the proposed attack is demonstrated by applying it to the hardware implementation 
of HMAC on ADM-RXC-5T1. The error injection module on the FPGA will inject errors into 
the HMAC module at specific times as controlled by a host PC. It is not a real attack but the 
error injection module just emulates the fault injection mechanism. A countermeasure to prevent 
such attacks by detecting the end-of-round errors is also suggested in this paper.  This attack is 
different from the work presented in this thesis as real clock glitches are created to inject faults.    
A key recovery attack using fault injection on HMAC/NMAC based on MD-5 and SHA-256 
hash function is presented in [42]. The proposed attack is based on the similar idea described in 
[40] which is to reduce the rounds in compression function by means of injecting faults. Figure 
2.7 shows the proposed fault model on HMAC where f indicates the hash function. 
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Their attack results claim to recover the n-word secret key with [n/3] fault injections in the case 
of HMAC-SHA-256. However it is a theoretical attack and there is no information available on 
the feasibility or computational complexity of this proposed method.  
                                 
   Figure 2.7 Fault injection attack on HMAC [42] 
 
None of the above mentioned works utilized real injected faults in their attacks and they all have 
varying complexity. The varying complexity refers to the type of fault model used, the number 
of faulty outputs required to extract the secret inputs, and time of execution.  
2.5 Existing Countermeasures 
 
The need to make hardware implementation of crypto systems robust against fault injection has 
resulted in the study of fault detection schemes [43]. Most of the proposed countermeasures are 
based on redundancy and can be classified as follows:  
Hardware Redundancy: based on duplicating one or more functional blocks. The error can be 
detected by comparing the outputs of two distinct blocks that implement the same function.  
Information Redundancy: based on error detecting codes that uses check bits generated from 
the original message. This error code will be propagated with the message and can be validated 
at the end [44].  
Temporal Redundancy: based on repeating the process twice or computing the inverse function 
in some cases. But this can result in reducing the throughput.  
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Juliato et al. has presented FPGA based Fault tolerant schemes for SHA-256 architectures to 
ensure secure communication in space applications [45] [46]. They have employed Hamming 
codes to protect the registers of SHA-256 and analyzed the resistance of proposed architectures 
against single event upsets (SEUs).  
To provide a sufficient level of security against fault attacks, several factors must be considered. 
This will require combination of different classes of countermeasures to ensure overall 
protection.  The countermeasures against fault attacks are not experimented in this thesis.  
2.6 Summary 
 
This chapter began with an introduction to fault attacks along with different methods of fault 
injection and types of faults. A brief review about the fault attacks on various cryptosystems like 
AES was discussed. The SHA-256 and HMAC algorithms were described along with a 
discussion of previous implementation techniques. A review of specific fault injection research 
on HMAC/SHA was presented. It was shown that very few researchers have studied real (not 
simulated or emulated) fault injection on HMAC/SHA. Since the hardware implementation of 
SHA-256 is also considered as a part of this thesis, the architecture used for implementing it will 
be discussed in Chapter 4. The existing fault injection attacks on HMAC/SHA are mostly based 
on the technique proposed by Choukri and Tunstall [40]. In the next chapter the design of clock 
glitch along with the glitch generator based on an FPGA will be discussed.  The proposed 
method aims at inducing setup violations in the critical paths which will be discussed later.  
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Chapter 3  
Methodology and Experimental Setup 
 
This chapter describes the methodology used to design and test the proposed fault injection 
testbed, including the SHA-256 core and clock glitch generator. The details of the Altera DE2 
board, Phase Locked Loop and the set up of an FPGA based clock glitch circuit is described in 
this chapter. 
 
3.1 Fault Injection  
 
There are other approaches apart from clock glitching for injecting faults into the FPGA, which 
maybe for example heating the device, under powering the device, use of electromagnetic 
radiations and other approaches as outlined in Section 2.2.1.  
Fault injection using heating the device would require temperature sensors to verify the increase 
in temperature. The thermal fault injections can result in invasive faults in the sensitive areas of a 
device. In addition, excessive heating could permanently damage the entire circuit.  Fault 
injection using voltage underfeeding would require a custom circuit that can drop the feeding 
voltage below a certain value. The use of electromagnetic radiation may also induce faults in a 
device without tapping into it. However electromagnetic radiation typically affects the device 
uniformly through the power signal. Hence the parts of the device that should not be subjected to 
fault injection may require proper shielding.  
The main objective of this thesis is to incorporate a low cost environment including the circuit 
under test and the fault injection circuit onto a single FPGA chip. In addition this setup is to be 
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used to study the effect of fault injection on SHA-256.  Hence the above mentioned methods 
were discarded and the use of an onboard PLL to set up a simple clock glitch generator was 
considered.  
 
3.2 Setup Time Violation Using Clock Glitches  
 
 As discussed in Chapter 2, fault injection attacks are becoming popular in the field of hardware 
and embedded cryptography. With the use of dedicated cryptanalytic techniques, an attacker can 
extract secret information from the faulty bits or bytes or words. The complexity of these fault 
injection attacks are found to be less as compared to classical cryptanalysis techniques. This 
section discusses the theory behind clock glitches and how they result in setup time violation.  
The configurable logic blocks (CLB) that form the basic logic unit of most reprogrammable  
FPGAs are made up of two components – flip flops and look up tables. The flips flops are used 
to synchronize the logic and save the logic states between clock cycles. There can be hundreds of 
flip flops that define the current state of a circuit. The combinational logic in between these flip 
flops calculates the next state or computes data. These logic blocks are implemented on FPGAs 
with the lookup tables or static RAM and a simplification is given in Figure 3.1. On every clock 
edge a flip flop has to latch a value on its input and hold that value constant until the next clock 
edge. 
                                    
       Figure 3.1 Representation of Digital ICs [30] 
 
The registers latch the data on the rising clock edges. Between two sequential rising clock edges, 
the data propagates from one register through combinatorial logic blocks that might modify the 
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data and back into a register. The time taken by the data to propagate through the combinatorial 
logic is called the propagation delay. The maximum propagation delay of an entire circuit or 
chip is called its critical path. Another important parameter is the setup time, which is a 
characteristics of the flip-flops. The setup time is the minimum time a signal has to be available 
or stable at the input to the buffer before the active edge of clock arrives. Both the critical path 
and the set up time are parameters that determine the maximum operating frequency or speed of 
any circuit. For a circuit to operate correctly, the clock period must be greater than the sum of 
critical path and setup time.  
     Tclk > tcritical + tsetup  
In the case of fault injection attacks using clock glitches, the attacker uses several methods to 
violate the above condition. An option that can be considered is to switch between the clock 
signals so as to shorten the length of a single clock cycle [25]. This shortening can result in 
corrupting the data to be latched.  
A similar situation is shown in figure 3.2, where a normal clock is at the top and the clock with a 
glitch is at the bottom of the figure. The r_in and r_out signals represents the input and output of 
the data register respectively and CLK is the clock signal. Under normal operation the time 
intervals between the positive edges for each clock is longer than the circuit’s maximum delay 
and hence the intermediate states (mn) are correctly stored. Assuming the normal clock is set to a 
maximum clock frequency for the design, the glitch generates a clock cycle which is shorter than 
the sum of critical path and setup time causing a setup time violation. As a result the incorrect 
output r_in of the combinational logic is latched in the register r_out, shown as incorrect value of 
X (variable) in Figure 3.2.  These kinds of fault injections which are transient in nature can 
induce faults without leaving tamper evidence.  
27 
 
                   
  Figure 3.2 Normal clock (above) and glitch clock (below) [25]  
 
 
3.3 Generating Clock Glitch  
 
The circuit for generating the clock glitch is implemented in an Altera DE2 board. The clock 
glitch generator has two main components, namely a Phase locked loop (PLL) and a multiplexer. 
The PLL available on the DE2 boards is used to generate the clocks of a desired frequency and 
phase shift (delay) with reference to an input clock. It can generate three clock signals namely 
C0, C1 and C2 out of which C1 and C2 will be used for the clock glitch circuit. A multiplexer is 
used to switch between these clocks. The select input of the multiplexer is generated by another 
component that has an internal counter which monitors the time to enable the select input to the 
multiplexer.  
The block design file of the PLL with the input and output is shown in Figure 3.3. The locked 
output signal of the PLL is used to indicate whether or not the PLL has locked onto the reference 
clock. A logical high on this signal indicates a stable PLL clock output in phase with the PLL 
reference input clock [47]. The locked port can be connected to any general purpose I/O pin on 
the FPGA. The inclk0 is the input clock to the PLL and it is driven by CLOCK_50 on the Altera 
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DE2 board. The waveform simulation showing the various input and output signals of the PLL is 
given in Figure 3.4.  
The parameters of the output clock signals (namely frequency, phase shift, duty cycle, and clock 
multiplication/division) can be set using the ALTPLL MegaWizard feature available on the Altera 
Quartus II programming tool. In this example the frequency, duty cycle and phase (delay) of C0 
was set to 50 MHz, 50 % and -3 ns respectively. The parameters of C1 was 50 MHz, 50%, 0ns 
and that of C2 was 114.28 MHz, 50 %, 0 ns. The output frequency of 114.28 MHz was achieved 
by keeping the clock multiplication / division to be 16/7. A detailed description of how to 
configure the PLL is given in Appendix A.  
 
 
   Figure 3.3 Block diagram file of Altera Phase Locked Loop  
 
 
         Figure 3.4 Waveform Simulation showing the input and output signals of the PLL 
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The clock signals C1 and C2 is are fed to a 2*1 multiplexer (designed using logic gates) whose 
output is the CLK_OUT signal. The multiplexer select signal (S) is generated by a component 
shown as SEL_GEN in Figure 3.5 that has an internal counter. The counter is designed to run at 
50 MHz which is the default frequency of the circuit under test. This allows the circuit to keep 
track of the SHA-256 operation rounds, where each operation is one clock cycle. The clock 
switching takes place between rounds 55 and 60.  The clock switching will produce glitches in 
CLK_OUT, the multiplexer output which is the clock of the SHA-256 module. The block 
diagram showing the connections between PLL, multiplexer and select signal generator is shown 
in Figure 3.5. A sample waveform simulation showing glitches in the output clock at the time of 
clock switching is shown on Figure 3.6.  
 
                                   
             Figure 3.5 Block diagram showing the components of glitch generator circuit 
The SEL_GEN that generates the select input(S) for the multiplexer was described in VHDL with 
three inputs namely C1, C2 and reset. It has a counter that increments the count on the rising 
edge of clock C1. When the program begins the select signal S is set to 1 and the counter will 
keep track of the SHA-256 operation rounds. Once the count reaches 54 the select signal will be 
made 0 and then back to 1 when the count is 60. This switches the clock to C2 from round 55 to 
60 and back to C1 from round 61. 
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             Figure 3.6 Waveform simulation showing presence of glitch during clock switching  
 
3.4 Methodology and Experimental Setup 
 
This section provides an overview of the FPGA board used for implementing SHA-256 and the 
other software, hardware requirements needed for the experiment. The targeted device along 
with the system architecture is also discussed.  
 
3.4.1 Targeted Device – Altera DE2 Board 
 
One of the main objectives of this thesis is to incorporate the entire system on a single FPGA, 
specifically the Circuit under Test, Glitch Generator and the Interface. For this an Altera DE2 
board was selected. The block diagram of DE2 board is shown in Figure 3.7. The Altera DE2 
board is built around a Cyclone II programmable logic device and it provides a flexible platform 
for developing and testing embedded system applications. The Altera Quartus II design tool 
allows the user to reconfigure the Cyclone II FPGA device to implement different designs. The 
components which are designed and implemented on the FPGA include the following: 
 Phase locked loop (PLL) for generating clock signals 
 SHA-256 core -custom VHDL component  
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 Component for timing and the glitch 
 Nios II embedded processor to communicate with the SHA-256  
 
The Altera Megawizard tool was used to design and create the PLL, and Nios II interface 
whereas other elements used in the design were specified using VHDL.  A photograph that 
shows the layout of a DE2 board is given on Figure 3.9. There are 50 MHz and 27 MHz 
oscillators on the board that can be used as possible clock sources. The board supports an 
external clock input as well. An external power supply source provides the power supply 
connector with 9.0 V. A USB Blaster port is provided for configuring the board. The JTAG 
interface of FPGA chip can be used to communicate with the board which connects to the USB 
port on the host PC. This interface will transfer the hardware design from the PC onto the 
Cyclone II device using the hardware configuring process. It can also be used to communicate 
with the Nios II processor configured on the FPGA, through downloading software to run on the 
Nios II processor as shown in Figure 3.8.  
 
                             
   Figure 3.7 Block diagram of Altera DE2 board [48] 
32 
 
    
                 
                                                  Figure 3.8 System Architecture 
 
    Figure 3.9 Altera DE2 board layout [48]  
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3.4.2 Methodology 
 
 The FPGA-based fault injection testbed was designed such that the message input to SHA-256 
could be controlled and outputs from SHA-256 after a specific round could be observed. 
Furthermore fault injection was controllable, or in other words the specific round for the fault 
injection could be controlled. In order to have the controllability and observability, it was 
necessary not only to have the SHA-256 and clock glitch circuitry on the FPGA, but also the 
Nios II processor. NIST test vectors [8] were utilized to verify the designed architectures. 
As outlined in Section 2.3, SHA-256 will accept a 512 bit block input message and produce a 
256 bit output hash. In the SHA-256 proposed architecture, a ready (rdy) signal is produced 
which is used to communicate with the Nios II interface. The input message block is fed to the 
input ports of SHA-256 through the Nios II interface. The rdy signal is initially 0 and after 
writing the final hash values to its output ports, the SHA-256 module will make the rdy signal 1. 
Nios II waits until rdy is 1 in order to read the results from its pio pins which are driven by the 
output ports of SHA-256. A C program is used to send input messages to and read hash results 
from the SHA-256 core through the Nios II interface and the interconnections between them are 
made through the Avalon bus. The software is downloaded onto the RAM on the DE2 board and 
is run on the Nios II processor.  Note that the SHA-256 core uses glitched clock and the Nios II 
processor operates on a normal 50 MHz clock. After the rdy signal is made 1, the SHA core 
becomes inactive. Thus the Nios II processor can retrieve the data from the 8 output ports of the 
SHA core. These output ports can be made to read the final hash value or the values of working 
registers for specific rounds (a to h). This was done by modifying the VHDL code and 
downloading it to the board. The number of registers connected to the output port is always 8 so 
that the top level entity in SHA-256 design remains unchanged.  
 As discussed earlier the glitch generator has components to keep track of the clock cycles and 
switch the clock signals in the rounds were a glitch is desired. 
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3.5 Summary 
 
In this chapter the methodology and experimental set up for injecting clock glitch faults into an 
FPGA based implementation of SHA-256 is discussed. The glitch generator was designed using 
the PLL available on Cyclone II device and a multiplexer.  The architecture used for 
implementing SHA-256 will be discussed in the next chapter along with simulation and synthesis 
results.  
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Chapter 4  
Experiment and Results 
 
This chapter presents the two architectures considered for implementing SHA-256 on FPGA and 
their testing and verification followed by the area, frequency analysis. It is followed by the fault 
injection on SHA-256 using an FPGA based clock glitch circuit, experimental results, analysis 
and a brief comparison to previous works.  
4.1 Memory-Based Architecture 
 
 The memory-based hardware design for the SHA-256 core consists of logical operations, 32 bit 
adders and memory units to store the constants (Kt) as well as the output of message scheduler 
(Wt). The SHA-256 architecture can be divided into four main units: Message Scheduler, 
Constant Memory, Compressor and Intermediate hash computation. The first 16 words Mt of the 
message are stored in the first 16 locations of the memory unit for message scheduler. It will take 
16 clocks to do so and from clock 17 to 64 the corresponding values of Wt are calculated and 
stored into memory using equation given in Step 2 (Section 2.3.1). The initialization of the 
registers a to h can be done during reset. Once the message scheduling and initialization is 
completed, the compressor will use registers a to h, and Wt and Kt to determine the new values of 
a to h. The SHA-256 algorithm performs 4 rounds of compression and this can be controlled 
internally by using an iteration counter.  After 64 rounds of iteration the intermediate hash 
computation is performed as given in Step 4 (Section 2.3.1).In the case of a single block message 
the hash computation is completed at this point but for a multi-block message a new execution 
cycle will begin.  
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This architecture was designed and compiled on Altera Quartus II 10.1 platform with the 
targeted device EP2C35F672C6. It was simulated using Altera Vector Waveform Simulation 
and results were verified using NIST test vectors as shown in Figure 4.1. However the final 
verification in the hardware was not successful as there were errors in the SHA-256 output. After 
significant debugging it was determined that the value of W from clock cycles 17 to 64 was 
corrupted. To calculate each value of Wt four previous values of Wt are required. As long as W is 
being implemented in memory, this cannot be achieved in single clock. It was determined that 
this was the likely error in the hardware design, despite successful VHDL simulation of the 
architecture. In order to overcome this a second design was considered based on registers and 
will be described in the next section 4.2.  
 
 
    Figure 4.1 SHA-256 waveform Simulation  
      
4.2 Pipelined Register-Based Architecture 
 
 The second proposed design for SHA-256 consists of logical operations, 32 bit adders, memory 
unit for constants and shift registers for the message scheduling. The total number of registers 
required is 1048. The array of SHA-256 constants will be synthesized as a memory block which 
in turn requires 2048 bits. The architecture can be divided into the following blocks as shown in 
Fig. 4.2: Message scheduler, constant memory, compressor and Intermediate hash computation. 
The message scheduler uses 16 shift registers number 0 to 15 as shown in Figure 4.2. These can 
be initialized either in serial or in parallel. Parallel initialization requires us to store the values 
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internally and then load them directly into registers W0 to W15. In the case of serial initialization 
the first 16 words Mt of the message can be shifted into the registers over 16 clock cycles. It will 
take one clock to initialize the working variables and initial hash values. This can be done at 
reset. Once the initialization is complete, the hash compressor will use registers a to h, Wt and Kt 
to calculate new values for a to h as shown in Figure 4.2.   
 
 Figure 4.2 SHA-256 Architecture – message scheduling and hash computation 
    
The algorithm will run for 64 iterations and can be monitored by an iteration counter. After 64 
iterations the intermediate hash computation is performed by adding the content of registers a to 
h with the initial hash values as given in step 4 of SHA-256 algorithm given in Section 2.3.1. In 
the case of a single block message the hash computation is completed at this point but for a 
multi-block message a new execution cycle will begin. Note that in HMAC-SHA-256 the first 
message block is the secret key, hence at least 2 message blocks will be computed within the 
SHA-256. This architecture was designed and compiled on Altera Quartus II 10.1 platform with 
the targeted device EP2C35F672C6. The verification was done in two stages. For the behavioral 
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simulation the Altera Quartus II Vector waveform simulation was used and it was tested using 
the NIST test vectors and verified result. The circuit was synthesized and the final verification 
was done by running the program on the DE2 board.  The Nios II soft core processor interface 
was designed to communicate with SHA-256 core. A C software program was written to send 
the input and read the output from the SHA-256 core. 
 
  Figure 4.3 Schematic design file showing SHA-256 and Nios II Interface  
  
4.2.1 Area and Frequency Analysis 
   
The proposed architecture for SHA-256 was described in VHDL. An assortment of hardware 
such as Nios II processor, PLL for generating clock signals and the input output peripherals 
(PIO) for Nios II were added using the Altera SOPC builder. It was implemented on Altera 
Cyclone II EP2C35F672C6 FPGA using the Altera Quartus II 10.1 tools. The input clock for the 
PLL was chosen as 50 MHz. The design was tested using different clocks and the maximum 
clock frequency was found to be 114.29 MHz which was obtained by selecting the clock 
multiplication factor as 16 and division factor to be 7.  The next possible frequency that can be 
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produced by the PLL was 120 MHz however the SHA-256 core was not compatible with this 
frequency.  
The implementation area measured as the number of total Logic Elements used (LE) for the 
proposed SHA-256 partial implementation is given in Table 4.1. The logic element utilization 
was found to be 5175 out of the 33,216 available logic elements on the targeted device. The 
throughput is defined as the number of message bits processed per amount of time, measured in 
bits per second (bps). Throughput can be computed as Throughput = (B*F)/c, where B is the 
message block size in bits, F is the operating clock frequency and c is the number of clock cycles 
needed to compute the hash value.  
 
Logic Elements (# equivalent gates) 5175 out of 33,216  
Total Registers 2783 
Maximum Frequency 114.29 MHz 
Throughput 914.29 Mbps 
 
      Table 4.1 SHA-256 partial implementation Area and Frequency Analysis  
     
                                              
                                                                               
4.3 Setup Time Violation on SHA-256 Using Clock 
Glitches 
 
This section describes the initial exploration of clock glitching. In particular it was observed that 
several parameters had to be carefully determined in order to produce a viable single clock glitch 
applicable for injecting faults into SHA-256.  
The SHA-256 registers were latched on the positive clock edge and hence it was required to have 
a glitch with time between the rising edges smaller than that of a normal clock. The maximum 
operating frequency of SHA -256 core, 114.29 MHz corresponds to a time period of 8.75 ns. The 
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next available frequency of the PLL, 120 MHz corresponds to 8.3 ns which was found to be 
incompatible with the SHA- 256 core. This clearly means that the sum of critical path and setup 
time is in the range of 8.3 ns to 8.75 ns. It is therefore important to generate a clock glitch which 
is shorter than 8 3ns to have successful fault injection.  
As discussed in section 3.4 the clock glitch circuit is connected to the SHA-256 core. The clock 
switching is controlled by the select input of the multiplexer. As the multiplexer output changes, 
there will be sudden change in the frequency of the clock which in turn produces glitch in the 
clock line of SHA-256. This is expected to result in a data misread in the rounds between 55 and 
60.  The complete circuit showing the SHA-256 core, the Nios II interface, PLL, the glitch 
generator circuitry is given in Figure 4.4.  
 
    
    Figure 4.4 CUT Schematic Design File    
 
41 
 
The output waveform of timing simulation (Figure 4.5) shows the glitch in output clock 
(CLK_OUT) during clock switching. It should be noted that the simulation given in Figure 4.5 is 
a timing simulation of the VHDL design and not the device simulation. This is why the final 
hash output is not showing any effect of the glitch.  
       
 
                                Figure 4.5 Waveform simulation showing the presence of glitch  
 
4.3.1 Varying Parameters of Clock  
 
The PLL available on the FPGA produces three clocks C0, C1, C2 out of which C1 and C2 are 
used in the glitch circuit. The parameters of these two clocks can be varied using the ALTPLL 
Megawizard plugin manager available on the Altera Quartus 10.1 tool. The external SDRAM 
interface for Nios II requires a special clock which was met by specifying the parameters of 
clock C0 to be 50 MHz, -3ns delay. The parameters of C1 were kept fixed (50 MHz, 50% duty 
cycle, 0ns delay) and that of C2 was varied. The output frequency, duty cycle and delay of C2 
was varied using the ALTPLL Megawizard.  The two clock signals C1 and C2 with different 
frequencies and delay can be fed into a multiplexer and is switched depending upon the select (S) 
signal. The range of frequencies selected for C2 was between 50 MHz and 114.29 MHz (the 
maximum frequency of SHA-256 core). Different combinations of frequencies from this range 
were chosen and were tested using the timing simulation to verify the presence of a clock glitch. 
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The frequencies between 50 MHz and 80 MHz were discarded for testing on hardware as they 
were producing glitched clock cycles whose period were almost equal to or even higher than the 
normal clock frequency. It was noted that the shape of the glitch changed as the delay of C2 was 
varied. The delay or phase shift of the PLL output clock with reference to the input clock can be 
varied using the ALTPLL Megawizard.  As the frequency of C2 approached 80 MHz, the 
CLK_OUT signal was observed to have clock cycle with period less than the normal clock 
during clock switching. All the clocks that were selected for testing on the FPGA are given in 
Table 4.2.  
Output Frequency Duty Cycle  Delay 
80 MHz 50% 0ns to  5ns 
90 MHz 50% 0ns to  5ns 
100 MHz 50% 0ns  to 3ns 
110 MHz 50% 0ns to  3ns 
 
     Table 4.2 Clock Parameters   
In the following waveforms CLK_IN is the input clock to the PLL and signals labelled LOCKED, 
C1_OUT, C2_OUT respectively are the locked output, clock 1 and clock 2 produced by the PLL. 
The switching is controlled by the select input (S) to the multiplexer which is generated by 
SEL_GEN component as discussed before. The test was repeated for different frequency and 
delay values of C2 with clock switching done between round 55 and 60 and the presence of 
glitch was confirmed (circled in the waveforms) as given in Figures 4.6 ,4.7 and 4.8.  
 
 
       Figure 4.6 C2 with 100 MHz and 1ns delay  
43 
 
 
          Figure 4.7 C2 with 100 MHz and 2.5 ns delay  
 
Figure 4.8 C2 with 110 MHz and 2.75ns delay 
 
 
After testing various frequency and delay values for C2 by using timing simulation as described 
above, it was decided to test it on hardware to confirm whether or not these glitches can induce 
faults.  
 
 4.3.2 Testing the Glitch on FPGA Implemented SHA-256 
 
The glitch circuit with parameters for creating glitches, from the previous section, was examined 
in conjunction with SHA-256 in order to determine if faults would be generated. The glitch 
generator circuit along with SHA-256 core was downloaded on to the Altera DE2 FPGA board 
and the C program was made to run on the Nios II soft core processor to obtain final hash output. 
The clock switching was performed between rounds 55 and 60 as described earlier.   
The experiment was first run without glitch at 50 MHz and 114.29 MHz clock to verify that the 
circuit could run at this speed. This was done to make sure that the error in the final hash is due 
to the glitch and not because of an incompatible clock. An incompatible clock can result in 
metastability condition and a corrupted output.   
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Fault injection was successful by changing frequency of the circuit from 50 MHz to 110 MHz 
and also from 50 MHz to 100 MHz between rounds 55 and 60 as discussed before. The value of 
registers at the end of round 58 and 60 were checked. The tables below shows the register value 
samples for different tests for the input block (0xFFFFFFFF).  
 
Registers  Expected result Obtained result Number of bits in error 
a 64D09224 25A10307 12   
b DD734AC5 CBB30864 10 
c 6E2F65B1 CF0BEDF0 9 
d 16788381 0E30CB01 7 
e BBE50132 6AFD02C7 13 
f 384AC793 B05A469B 7 
g 94856D88 1001E90C 8 
h B5DD28B7 3DC5203F 7 
 
      Table 4.3 Test one C2 100 MHz:  register contents at end of round 58 
Registers  Expected result Obtained result Number of bits in error 
a 64D09224 E0B80610 11  
b DD734AC5 9C315E8D 8 
c 6E2F65B1 EE674135 7 
d 16788381 13FA02C3 8 
e BBE50132 830739B2 11 
f 384AC793 78488F11 8 
g 94856D88 BCCD25A4 9 
h B5DD28B7 AD9D00C7 8 
 
                   Table 4.4 Test two C2 110 MHz: register contents at end of round 58  
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Registers  Expected result Obtained result Number of bits in error 
a 998C47AD D413CCCE 18   
b 45AEF1AB 76CF5D0A 14 
c 5E2580BE 78DDE6E4 16 
d 64D09224 4A9FEA74 15 
e 4A63C5B9 A21CA4FE 18 
f 52F36C3D 36FAD138 13 
g 3DCB2DFC 3F07B356 14 
h BBE50132 B7C19A32  9 
   
                  Table 4.5 Test three C2 100 MHz:  register contents at end of round 60  
 
Registers  Expected result Obtained result Number of bits in error 
a 998C47AD D92A8810 17  
b 45AEF1AB 14A4F0F3 9 
c 5E2580BE 2735006F 11 
d 64D09224 E7B07C4A 10 
e 4A63C5B9 79AED409 14 
f 52F36C3D 40E754DE 12 
g 3DCB2DFC 2DFA1CCD 10 
h BBE50132 3BD712B4  10 
 
                          Table 4.6 Test four C2 110 MHz: register contents at the end of round 60 
 
 The change in clock source is expected to produce a glitch and as a result the generated clock 
will be shorter than the sum of max delay and set up time. This will result in the set up time 
violation resulting in the latching of an incorrect value by the combinational logic elements and 
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the error propagates to next rounds.  The register contents at the end of round 58 and 60 as 
shown in the above tables validates this assumption.  
 The select signal going from 1 0 1 will result in clock switching from C1  C2  C1 and 
this produces two glitches and the errors in final hash output are due to multiple glitches. 
However the future work would expand this idea to design fault model based on single glitch. 
The experiment was repeated multiple times for a chosen C2 (frequency, delay) and the 
generated fault values were found to be random.   
After testing the hardware for varying values of C2 it was noticed that the glitch produced during 
clock shift may or may not cause an error in final output. It was observed that there was no error 
in the final output for certain clock glitches but for some other glitches there was error in the 
final output. After analyzing the glitch waveforms it was found that the period and width of those 
clock glitches that couldn’t produce any error was significantly larger than the one that produced 
the error. Even though the timing simulation results for clock switching from 50 MHz to 80 MHz 
and from 50 MHz 90 MHz had a glitch cycle, it didn’t produce any error in the output while 
testing on hardware. The period of the glitch in these cases was found to be higher than 8 ns. It 
should be noted that the maximum operating frequency of SHA-256 core was found to be 114.29 
MHz (period of 8.75 ns).  
The glitches produced by the 100 MHz and 110 MHz had period mostly around 6.13 ns which is 
less than the period of maximum clock supported by the design.  
From the synthesis results it was observed that the clock glitch circuit was successful in injecting 
fault for some of the glitches and caused error in final output. The period of the glitch is an 
important factor in producing error. It can be assumed that for all the values of glitch period less 
than a particular minimum value, it is not possible for the hardware to treat it as a clock and will 
not produce any error in the hash computation. Similarly for all glitch periods higher than a 
particular maximum value, the hardware treats it as a normal clock and will not result in a set up 
time violation.  The main observations are listed below:  
 The results of timing simulation of the glitch circuit shows that the clock switchover can 
produce glitches in the clock line. The period and width of the glitch depends on the 
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period of the individual clocks, their phase difference and the select signal that triggers 
the clock switching. 
 The resulting glitches may or may not produce error in the output and the error injecting 
capability of a glitch is dependent on its period and width.  
 In the case of a glitch generator using the onboard PLL, the glitch cycle can be generated 
only after the PLL has locked onto the reference clock as indicated by the locked signal. 
 The hardware experiments confirmed that the glitch generator circuit can inject fault in 
the SHA-256 implementation.  
 It can be assumed that fault injection happens in an interval of glitch width. The 
knowledge of this interval is very important for the attacker to precisely control the fault 
injection.  
 
The position of faulty bytes or bits is a matter of further research. We cannot apply the idea of set 
up time violation to all bytes as different bytes will have different path delays. It requires a much 
more advanced experimental set up to analyze the nature of bytes that are more susceptible to set 
up time violation.  The experiment was repeated with two different set of input blocks. As 
mentioned above certain bytes are more prone to faults which may be attributed to their path 
delay. Any particular bit that is fed as an input to a register gets there on its own logical path and 
has a different propagation time. 
A change in the input block to the SHA-256 core will result in changes in propagation times and 
the probability of inducing a fault. The difference in propagation time can also be due to the 
difference in operations that the bytes undergoes. 
 In the case of SHA-256 compression function the registers a and e undergoes a different 
operation as compared to the other registers. Those bytes that are being used by the register a and 
e are supposed to have a higher delay as compared to the other registers (since they pass through 
more logical computations). This could be the reason why the registers a and e had more bits in 
error than other registers. The FPGA level architecture showing the logic element on the Cyclone 
II device after the place and route is given in Figure 4.8.  
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             Figure 4.9 FPGA level architecture showing the logic element on Cyclone II device  
 
In order to generate the glitches, the frequency, phase and duty cycle of the clock signals must be 
controlled very precisely. The use of an onboard Phase Locked Loop has a lot of limitation when 
it comes to higher accuracy and precision. The Phase locked loops on Cyclone II FPGAs don’t 
support the dynamic phase configuration feature as compared to Stratix IV, Cyclone III family of 
devices. This feature will allow the user to dynamically adjust the phases of the PLL output 
clocks. A fine phase shift resolution of up to 1/8th of the VCO frequency can be achieved using 
dynamic phase stepping in real time.  Another important factor is the speed of clock switching – 
the use of high speed switches is expected to improve the performance. The idea to precisely 
control the clock parameters and high speed switching can be incorporated to set up an efficient 
clock glitch generator based on an FPGA, like the one in [28].  
The main objective of this thesis was to research the vulnerability of FPGA based 
implementation of SHA-256 towards a simple fault attack using clock glitches within a testbed 
and hence exploring more sophisticated glitch generation circuit is beyond the scope of this 
work. 
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4.4 Comparison to Previous Works  
 
The study of fault attacks on SHA-256 is a relatively new subject and the published research 
work on this topic is limited. The fault attack on hardware implementation of SHA-512 
discussed in [41] uses glitches in power supply for the physical injection of fault. It is based on 
flipping control bits to reduce the number of rounds in SHA-512. Most of the fault injection 
attack against FPGA implementation of AES uses the method suggested by Piret and Quisquarter 
in [26]. The work discussed in [27] uses the glitch generator module and AES code from the 
DPA contest. The characteristics of the glitch that generated the fault and the effect of faults 
were also studied. As compared to the previous research, the work done in this thesis aims at 
incorporating the SHA-256 core and other circuitry for fault injection on a single FPGA board 
and to test its vulnerability towards clock glitch fault injection. 
 
4.5 Summary  
 
In this chapter the synthesis results for two different architectures for implementing SHA-256 in 
hardware are presented. The second register-based architecture was used to test the viability of a 
clock based fault injection on SHA-256. An FPGA based clock glitch generator was designed to 
inject the glitch that examined the feasibility of such fault injections in practical. From the 
experimental results it was concluded that fault injection is possible only for certain glitches. It is 
concluded that the period of the glitch is the key factor that decides the fault injection.  
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Chapter 5  
Discussion and Conclusions 
 
This section provides a brief summary of the thesis work and conclusion of the obtained results 
and future work. 
 
5.1 Summary and Discussion 
 
 In this thesis the viability of a setup time violation attack using clock glitches on SHA-256 
implemented in a FPGA was experimented. For this purpose a SHA-256 core was first designed 
and implemented on the DE2 board. Two slightly different architectures were considered for 
implementing SHA-256 and one of them was selected.  It was tested with different inputs to 
verify correct functioning.  
The clock glitch generator circuit was designed using the phase locked loop available on the DE2 
board to produce the required clock signals and a multiplexer to switch between the clock 
signals. The select input for the multiplexer was generated using a component with an internal 
counter that keeps track of the SHA-256 operation rounds.  The output of this circuit was tested 
and verified by means of timing simulation and the results confirmed the presence of glitches in 
the output clock line at the time of clock switching.  
The effect of clock glitch on the SHA-256 architecture was experimented by testing the complete 
circuit on the DE2 board. The experiment was repeated for varying clock parameters and it 
confirmed that the onboard glitch generator could successfully inject faults in the SHA-256. The 
glitches are expected to produce set up time violation in the flip-flops of the FPGA and the 
51 
 
results clearly show the vulnerability of FPGA implementations of SHA-256 towards set up time 
violation attacks using clock glitches.  
It was observed that the parameter of the glitches, mainly its period and width are the factors that 
determine whether fault injection is successful or not. The shape of the glitch was changed when 
the phase shifts (delay) of the clocks used were varied. This can be further explored to 
parameterize the shape of a glitch. The fault occurrence requires the attacker to have precise 
control over these factors. The use of an onboard PLL has its own limitations and better results 
can be expected with the use of PLL that allows dynamic configuration.  
The main focus of this thesis was to study the viability of fault injection using clock glitches on a 
FPGA implementing SHA-256. Hence the nature and effect of the fault was not researched. 
Moreover a much more sophisticated experimental set up is required in order to study further 
detailed effects of fault injection on the FPGA. The clock glitch characterization and the 
resulting faults on SHA-256 can be researched further. It is important to note that the change in 
input block also changes the probability of injecting errors. This is probably due to the difference 
in path delay of the individual bytes.  
To the best of our knowledge this is the first FPGA-based testbed with an onboard clock glitch 
generator using PLL to test the viability of fault injection on SHA-256 using clock glitches. The 
glitch generator implemented on the same FPGA provides a uniform testbed and it allows 
provides a low cost environment to study the viability of these kind of attacks on cryptographic 
systems. This proposed research is unlike previous research. For example the glitch generator 
discussed in [25] which is applied against AES, uses external equipment such as pulse generators 
and oscilloscopes to conduct the attack. On-chip glitch-clock generator for fault injection 
discussed in [28] is applied on an RSA cryptosystem and it uses safe error attack on RSA. The 
glitch characterization presented in [27] is based on the idea in [28] and have investigated the 
glitch characteristics and effects on AES S-box.  
5.2 Conclusion and Future Work 
 
 In this thesis the viability of fault attack using clock glitches against SHA-256 was studied. The 
basic principle of fault injection and different methods to conduct such attacks in practice were 
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outlined in Chapter 2. The SHA-256 and HMAC algorithms were also introduced in this chapter 
and a survey of their hardware implementations was also done. Chapter 3 introduces the fault 
injection method using clock glitches and the proposed circuit to produce glitches.  The targeted 
FPGA board to implement the SHA-256 was also introduced. The simulation results of the two 
architectures considered for implementing SHA-256 was presented in Chapter 4 along with the 
area and frequency analysis of the selected architecture. It was followed by the simulation and 
the implementation results of clock glitch circuit and the main observations.  
A uniform hardware testbed to study the viability of fault injection attack using clock glitches is 
presented in this thesis. The entire circuit is based on a single FPGA without the need of an 
external pulse generator and oscilloscope. In this work the nature and characteristics of the faults 
are not explored. We have only examined whether or not the glitches produced error in the 
output of hash computation. Future work would involve expanding the circuit to have precise 
control over the glitch parameters namely the period and width. This way glitch characterization 
can be done and it will be very useful to design efficient fault models.  
The uniform hardware set up presented in this work can be used to test the vulnerabilities of 
other cryptosystems towards similar attacks. So the future work would involve implementing and 
testing other cryptosystems as well.  
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APPENDICES 
 
APPENDIX A  
 
The Nios II processor, the Phase locked loop was specified using the Altera SPOC builder and 
the steps are listed below. The following instructions based on the tutorial available in the Altera 
website [49] 
Hardware and Software requirements  
 A PC running on Windows XP , Vista or 7 operating systems 
 Nios II software development tools version 10.1 
 Quartus II software version 10.1 
 
Create Quartus II project 
To start the Quartus II software, choose all programs – Altera – Quartus  
To create project do the following steps 
1. Choose New Project wizard (File Menu). 
2. Click Next in the introduction. 
3. Specify your working directory, name of the project.  
4. Click Next, and click yes if you are asked to create the new directory. 
5. Click Next. 
6. Select Cyclone II in the family drop down menu and in the filter box select FBGA, 672 
pins and speed 6. Now choose EP2C35F672C6 from the list of available devices.  
7. Click Next. 
8. Leave all EDA tools unchecked and click Finish. 
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Create Nios II System Module 
The steps to create the top level block design file (.bdf) is explained below. 
Create a new .bdf 
1. Choose New (File Menu).  
2. Select Block diagram/Schematic File in the Device Design Files tab.  
3. Click OK 
4. Choose Save As from File Menu and in the File Name type the name as myNios. 
5. Click Save.  
 
SOPC Builder 
The steps to start SOPC builder are as follows: 
1. On the block editor window double click on the empty space. The Symbol dialog box 
will appear as shown below. 
 
 
2. Click on Megawizard Plug-In Manager. Select create. 
3. Select Create Custom Megafunction variation from which action do you want to 
perform?  
4. Under installed Plug-Ins select the Altera SOPC builder.  
5. Specify the device family as Cyclone II, output file to be VHDL and give the name as 
myCPU.  
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6. Click Next and this will load the Altera SOPC builder and the System Contents tab will 
be displayed as shown below. 
 
Now the Nios II CPU and peripherals can be added to the system. To add these follow the steps 
below: 
 
Nios II  
To add Nios 32-bit CPU, select Nios II processor under Processors. Click Add and the wizard 
displays. Specify the following options. 
 Nios II Selector Guide : Nios II/s  
 Hardware Multiply: None 
 Hardware Divide: Unchecked 
Click Next. The Caches and Tightly Coupled Memories tab will appear. 
 Specify the following settings: 
 Instruction Cache: 4 Kbytes 
 Enable Bursts (Burst Size: 32 Bytes): Unchecked 
 Include Tightly Coupled Instruction Master Port(s): Unchecked 
Click Finish. 
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Error messages appear in the SOPC Builder Messages window. These messages are normal and 
will be fixed later. 
System ID  
Do the following to add the system ID peripheral: 
 In the list of available components, select Peripherals and then Debug and Performance and then 
System ID Peripheral. Click Add and once you return to the SOPC Builder main page, you will 
need to rename the sysid_0 to sysid.  
JTAG UART 
The JTAG UART provides a convenient way to communicate character data with the Nios II 
processor through the USBBlaster download cable. To add the JTAG UART peripheral, uart_0, 
do the following: 
Under Communication select JTAG UART and click Add. The Avalon UART – uart_0 wizard 
displays. Do not change the default settings Click Finish. You are returned to the Altera SOPC 
Builder window.  
External SDRAM Interface  
To add the external SDRAM peripheral, sdram_0, perform the following steps: 
 Select the SDRAM controller from the component library and click Add and the SDRAM 
controller. In the Presets drop down box select (Custom). Under the Memory Profile tab set the 
Data Width to 16 bits .All the other settings can be left the default values. Click Finish to return 
to the Altera SOPC Builder window. 
Double click on the cpu_0 name. This will re-open the Nios II Processor Wizard. Select sdram_0 
for both of the vectors (Reset and Exception).  
This will eliminate the two of the errors we had earlier.  
Parallel I/O (pio) 
The pios are required to connect the Nios II to the other components like SHA core, PLL etc. To 
add the pios follow the steps below:  
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Select the pio from the Component Library and click Add. In the Avalon PIO – pio_0 wizard 
specify the options such as width based on the requirements.  
You will need to add 8 pios with the following specification.  
Width: 32 bits, Direction: Input 
After adding the pios rename them as pio_0, pio_1...pio_7.  
Now add a similar 1 bit input pio and rename it as pio_rdy. Similarly add a 32 bit output pio and 
rename it as pio_msg.  
After adding all of the above components, on the System Menu select Auto-Assign Base 
Addresses and Auto-Assign IRQs. Now click Generate in the SOPC builder. Save your design 
when asked by clicking yes. Once the system generation was successful message appears clock 
Ok to exit. The myCPU symbol attached to the cursor can be dropped on the block editor 
window and Save it. 
 Phase Locked Loop  
To build the PLL the ALTPLL wizard is to be used. Open the Mega Wizard Plug-in Manager as 
mentioned earlier. From the I/O folder select ALTPLL, output file as VHDL and name as 
shaPLL.  
On page 3 of the wizard select 50 MHz as shown in the figure below. 
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On page 4 deselect the boxes on optional input and on page 5 leave the default settings. On page 
6 specify the Clock C0 to be 50 MHz, -3ns delay. On page 6 add clock C1 50 MHz and specify 
you required parameters and similarly on page 7 for clock C2. Leave the default settings as such 
on page 9 and click Finish. This will return you to the block diagram file and drop the PLL 
symbol to the .bdf.  
Now open a new VHDL file and copy paste the SHA-256 code given in Appendix B. Save the 
file and add it to the current project. Choose File--Create and Update--Create Symbols for 
current file. Go to the block diagram window. Double click on empty space and from the Project 
select SHA and insert the symbol on the .bdf file as shown below. 
 
 
Add Pins & Primitives  
The pins can be added as described below.  
Click the Symbol Tool button on the Block Editor Toolbar. The Symbol dialog box will appear 
and in the primitive folder expand the pin folder. Add 3 input pins, 8 output pins and 1 
bidirectional pin.  
Connect one input pin to the input clock to the PLL (inclk0) and name it as CLOCK_50, another 
one to rst pin of SHA and name it as SW[17] and the third one to resent_n of myCPU and name 
it as SW[16]. Connect the output pins and bidirectional pin to the myCPU and rename them as 
shown in figure below.  
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The complete circuit and its connection were discussed in the Chapter 4. After connecting the 
components the pin assignments can be done using the .csv file for the DE2 board provided on 
the Altera Website. Download this file on to the project folder. Open Import Assignments dialog 
box under the Assignments Menu on Quartus tool. Browse the .csv file and click OK. Now open 
the Device dialog box on the Assignments menu. Select Device & Pin Option –Unused Pins—
Reserve all unused pins and select as input tri-stated.  
Compile Design  
Save the .bdf file and choose Start Compilation from the processing menu. After successful 
compilation the Cyclone II device can be configured. Details on configuring the device can be 
found on the Altera DE2 handbook.  
Testing Nios II system 
To test the system a new C/C++ Application has to be created. For this start the Nios II software 
build tools. Select the workspace which is same as the Quartus project directory. Choose 
File/New/Nios II Application and BSP from Template to open the new project wizard. Click the 
... button beside the SOPC Information File name: text box. The Open window should appear. 
Browse to the location of your project folder and select .sopcinfo file. Click Open. Name your 
project and select any template from the list provided (hello word for e.g.). Click Finish. This 
will crate the application program and the board support package. You can copy paste your 
program in the .c file on the application folder. Save the project, right click on bsp folder and 
select Nios II/Generate BSP. Click Project/Build All in the main menu. Once it is successfully 
compiled you can run the program on the DE2 board by choosing Run As/Nios II hardware.  
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APPENDIX B 
 
The VHDL design for SHA-256 is given below.  
library ieee; 
use ieee.std_logic_1164.all; 
use ieee.numeric_std.all; 
 
entity sha is 
port ( 
clk : in std_logic; 
rst : in std_logic; 
msg : in std_logic_vector(31 downto 0); --input  
hout0 : out std_logic_vector(31 downto 0); 
hout1 : out std_logic_vector(31 downto 0); 
hout2 : out std_logic_vector(31 downto 0); 
hout3 : out std_logic_vector(31 downto 0); 
hout4 : out std_logic_vector(31 downto 0); 
hout5 : out std_logic_vector(31 downto 0); 
hout6 : out std_logic_vector(31 downto 0); 
hout7 : out std_logic_vector(31 downto 0); 
 
 
rdy : inout std_logic 
); 
end entity sha; 
architecture rtl of sha is  
 
 
 --define all functions 
 --sigma0(x) 
 function e0(x: unsigned(31 downto 0)) return unsigned is 
 begin 
  return (x(1 downto 0) & x(31 downto 2)) xor (x(12 downto 0) & x(31 downto 13)) xor 
(x(21 downto 0) & x(31 downto 22)); 
 end e0;  
  
 --sigma1(x) 
 function e1(x: unsigned(31 downto 0)) return unsigned is 
 begin 
  return (x(5 downto 0) & x(31 downto 6)) xor (x(10 downto 0) & x(31 downto 11)) xor 
(x(24 downto 0) & x(31 downto 25)); 
 end e1; 
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 -- s0 & s1 are functions used in message expansion  
 function s0(x: unsigned(31 downto 0)) return unsigned is 
  variable y : unsigned(31 downto 0); 
 begin 
  y(31 downto 29) := x(6 downto 4) xor x(17 downto 15); 
  y(28 downto 0) := (x(3 downto 0) & x(31 downto 7)) xor (x(14 downto 0) & x(31 downto 
18)) xor x(31 downto 3); 
  return y; 
 end s0; 
   
 function s1(x: unsigned(31 downto 0)) return unsigned is 
  variable y : unsigned(31 downto 0); 
 begin 
  y(31 downto 22) := x(16 downto 7) xor x(18 downto 9); 
  y(21 downto 0) := (x(6 downto 0) & x(31 downto 17)) xor (x(8 downto 0) & x(31 downto 
19)) xor x(31 downto 10); 
  return y; 
 end s1; 
   
 function ch(x: unsigned(31 downto 0); y: unsigned(31 downto 0); z: unsigned(31 downto 0)) 
return unsigned is 
 begin 
  return (x and y) xor (not(x) and z); 
 end ch; 
 
 function maj(x: unsigned(31 downto 0); y: unsigned(31 downto 0); z: unsigned(31 downto 0)) 
return unsigned is 
 begin 
  return (x and y) xor (x and z) xor (y and z); 
 end maj; 
 
 function fw(x :unsigned(31 downto 0); y : unsigned(31 downto 0); u: unsigned(31 downto 0); v: 
unsigned (31 downto 0)) return unsigned is 
 begin 
  return (s1(x)+u+s0(y)+v); 
  end fw; 
    
 type word_array is array(0 to 63) of unsigned(31 downto 0); 
 constant k : word_array := ( X"428a2f98", X"71374491", X"b5c0fbcf", X"e9b5dba5", 
X"3956c25b", X"59f111f1", X"923f82a4", X"ab1c5ed5", 
                                                    X"d807aa98", X"12835b01", X"243185be", X"550c7dc3", X"72be5d74", 
X"80deb1fe", X"9bdc06a7", X"c19bf174", 
                                                    X"e49b69c1", X"efbe4786", X"0fc19dc6", X"240ca1cc", X"2de92c6f", 
X"4a7484aa", X"5cb0a9dc", X"76f988da", 
                                                    X"983e5152", X"a831c66d", X"b00327c8", X"bf597fc7", X"c6e00bf3", 
X"d5a79147", X"06ca6351", X"14292967", 
                                                    X"27b70a85", X"2e1b2138", X"4d2c6dfc", X"53380d13", X"650a7354", 
X"766a0abb", X"81c2c92e", X"92722c85", 
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                                                    X"a2bfe8a1", X"a81a664b", X"c24b8b70", X"c76c51a3", X"d192e819", 
X"d6990624", X"f40e3585", X"106aa070", 
                                                    X"19a4c116", X"1e376c08", X"2748774c", X"34b0bcb5", X"391c0cb3", 
X"4ed8aa4a", X"5b9cca4f", X"682e6ff3", 
                                                    X"748f82ee", X"78a5636f", X"84c87814", X"8cc70208", X"90befffa", 
X"a4506ceb", X"bef9a3f7", X"c67178f2" ); 
             
      
 signal a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h : unsigned (31 downto 0); 
 
 signal w0,w1,w2,w3,w4,w5,w6,w7,w8,w9,w10,w11,w12,w13,w14,w15 : std_logic_vector(31 
downto 0); 
 
  
begin  
  
 process (clk, rst) 
   
  variable t : integer := 0; 
   
  constant initialh0 : unsigned (31 downto 0) := X"6a09e667"; 
  constant initialh1 : unsigned (31 downto 0) := X"bb67ae85"; 
  constant initialh2 : unsigned (31 downto 0) := X"3c6ef372"; 
  constant initialh3 : unsigned (31 downto 0) := X"a54ff53a"; 
  constant initialh4 : unsigned (31 downto 0) := X"510e527f"; 
  constant initialh5 : unsigned (31 downto 0) := X"9b05688c"; 
  constant initialh6 : unsigned (31 downto 0) := X"1f83d9ab"; 
  constant initialh7 : unsigned (31 downto 0) := X"5be0cd19"; 
   
 
begin 
  if (rst = '0') then 
   rdy<='0'; 
   a<=initialh0; 
   b<=initialh1; 
   c<=initialh2; 
   d<=initialh3; 
   e<=initialh4; 
   f<=initialh5; 
   g<=initialh6; 
   h<=initialh7;  
     
   
  elsif(rising_edge(clk) and rdy='0') then 
   if (t < 64 ) then 
   if (t < 16) then  
     
    w15<=msg; 
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    e<=d + h + e1(e)+ ch(e,f,g) + unsigned(msg)+k(t);  
    a<=h + e1(e)+ ch(e,f,g) + unsigned(msg)+k(t)+ e0(a) + maj(a,b,c); 
     
    else 
    w15<= 
std_logic_vector(fw(unsigned(w14),unsigned(w1),unsigned(w9),unsigned(w0)));  
    e<=d + h + e1(e)+ ch(e,f,g) + 
fw(unsigned(w14),unsigned(w1),unsigned(w9),unsigned(w0)) +k(t); 
    a<=h + e1(e)+ ch(e,f,g) + 
fw(unsigned(w14),unsigned(w1),unsigned(w9),unsigned(w0)) +k(t)+ e0(a) + maj(a,b,c); 
    end if; 
     w0<=w1; 
     w1<=w2; 
     w2<=w3; 
     w3<=w4; 
     w4<=w5; 
     w5<=w6; 
     w6<=w7; 
     w7<=w8; 
     w8<=w9; 
     w9<=w10; 
     w10<=w11; 
     w11<=w12; 
     w12<=w13; 
     w13<=w14; 
     w14<=w15; 
      
     h<=g; 
     g<=f; 
     f<=e; 
     d<=c; 
     c<=b; 
     b<=a; 
      
      
     t := t + 1; 
    
     
   else  
 
   
     hout0 <= std_logic_vector(a + initialh0); 
     hout1 <= std_logic_vector(b + initialh1); 
     hout2 <= std_logic_vector(c + initialh2); 
     hout3 <= std_logic_vector(d + initialh3); 
     hout4 <= std_logic_vector(e + initialh4); 
     hout5 <= std_logic_vector(f + initialh5); 
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     hout6 <= std_logic_vector(g + initialh6); 
     hout7 <= std_logic_vector(h + initialh7); 
    
 
    rdy <= '1'; 
     
   end if; 
  end if; 
 end process; 
end rtl; 
  
  
  
  
   
   
   
   
